Critique of Foreign Intervention in Palestine: 1994-2004

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been profoundly contoured by foreign intervention for more than a century. Through foreign interventions, such as the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 and the Oslo Accords of 1993, as well as the Camp David Accords of 2000, external powers repeatedly tried to mediate and resolve the conflict while simultaneously deepening it. Although these foreign powers claimed their intentions were to promote peace, their methodologies were structurally flawed, as they routinely excluded Palestinian political agency in negotiations. Furthermore, the various periods of conflict in Palestine provided opportunities for foreign actors to act on national incentives, working towards solutions that would benefit their countries, rather than effectively working to achieve peace between the two nations. Using the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, the period of 1994-2004, as a case study, makes it clear that foreign-led peace processes ended unsuccessfully. The failure of these meetings consequently intensified the conflict. This is showcased after the Camp David summit in 2000, resulting in the Second Intifada. Israeli aggression is consistent to this day, continuing the mass displacement of Palestinians and the genocide of the Palestinian people.  

The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, signed between 1993 and 1999. The foreign actors involved in the series of accords were the United States under President Bill Clinton, Norway represented by Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, and Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak. The Oslo I Accords of 1993 were peace talks, intended to create momentum that would push Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach a final settlement and create a period where trust and confidence could grow (Weiner, 240). The Oslo Accords have two parts: mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles (Avi). On September 9, 1993, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel signed the “Letters of Mutual Recognition.”

Following this agreement, on September 13, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization Negotiator Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, also referred to as the Oslo Accords (Office of the Historian). The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government was negotiated and signed at the White House, although President Clinton’s administration did not initially make Israeli-Palestinian peace a priority because Clinton’s advisors believed that a diplomatic breakthrough would be more likely in Israeli-Syrian relations. Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of Palestinians, and the PLO renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace, a result of Israel’s insistence on the matter. Both sides agreed that the Palestinian Authority would be established and assume governing responsibilities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip over a five-year period (Office of the Historian). However, the trajectory of these negotiations was different from the realities of what occurred. September 1993 was just the beginning of a long process of negotiations between Palestine and Israel that would not end until 1999. The agreements reflected the asymmetrical relationship between the PLO and Israel, as Rabin made no commitment to enacting negotiation agreements beyond the recognition of the PLO. The agreements that were signed were merely a plan for what was to be determined and further negotiated in the future, rather than a concrete agreement that was put into action. Palestine faced a state that had the full backing of an international superpower, the United States.  

In 1994, the Israeli military began withdrawing from Gaza City and Jericho, transferring administrative and civil functions to the newly established Palestinian Authority per the Oslo II agreement. Between 1994 and 2000, the situation in occupied Palestine underwent a series of changes following the Oslo II Accords of 1993, with Yasser Arafat elected president of the Palestinian Authority. The Oslo II Accords also contained an interim agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed on the 28th of September 1995. This agreement, like all other Oslo Interim Agreements, stated that the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell under one territorial Unit with the expulsion of Jerusalem (Hassan, 69). However, the lines that determined this area had yet to be drawn. Israel had not made any steps forward to cement the agreements made at the Oslo II Accords, showing that they had no plans to finalize peace talks. More importantly, during Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, only the Israeli military was evacuated; the Israeli settlements remained (Hassan,69-70). Ambiguity around the withdrawal of forces and provisions for external security to be handled by Israel resulted in Israel’s continued hegemony over Palestinians and their territory 

By the end of the five-year interim period in 1999, no comprehensive peace agreement had been reached. Although foreign powers such as the United States and Egypt had acted as agents in negotiations, which allegedly wanted peace between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel, the Oslo Accords were a failure for the Palestinian people. Critical issues such as the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the establishment of a Palestinian state remained unresolved.  

The Camp David Summit of 2000 aimed to be the final step of the Oslo Accords. Ehud Barak, the prime minister of Israel at the time, asked U.S. President Bill Clinton to call for a meeting in an impartial place to finish the negotiations concerning the Oslo Accords. The summit started on July 11th in Camp David, Maryland, with the participation of Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak. The issues discussed, including the aforementioned status of Jerusalem, Israeli Settlements, and the return of Palestinian refugees, were difficult to resolve and required the full consensus of both parties. The negotiations at Camp David lasted fifteen days. Arafat’s expectations of any positive outcomes were low due to the stagnation of previous agreements and accords. The negotiations were completed without documentation or a protocol for results; all positions were conveyed orally. The Palestinians attending the summit, after all the breaches of agreements made in Oslo II, had hopes of reaching a compromise on the final status of borders (Baumgarten, Beck, Suleiman ).  

After days of negotiations, Ehud Barak proposed a deal that represented a fraction of what he wanted to do in reality. Prime Minister Barak proposed that Palestine have a state of their own that comprised 91% of the West Bank. Parts of Israel’s pre 1967 borders would be given to Palestine in exchange for the 9% of the West Bank that Israel would keep (Baumgarten, Beck, Suleiman). Furthermore, Palestine would be given East Jerusalem as the capital, but it would remain under residual Israeli sovereignty. However, Barak’s intentions were different. He only planned to withdraw only some of the settlers; the ones that remained in the West Bank would each receive 400-meter radius land. This was land that they had ownership of, and that Palestinians would not be permitted to enter. After further negotiations between Barack and Arafat, there were no concrete agreements by September 28, 2000. The conclusions of the summit were that the promise of authority would not be respected, and important demands of the Palestinians would be rejected. It had been agreed that Bill Clinton would read the conclusions of the Camp David summit to the press, but his speech manipulated the narrative, having placed blame on the Palestinians by accusing them of not making any concessions after Barak put his political career on the line when he accepted the division of Jerusalem. This further cements US-Israeli relations and reveals the bias the United States had in the peace negotiations. This resulted in a widespread uprising, dubbed the Intifada, that erupted on September 29, 2000, in the old city of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. This was caused by the September 28 visit of Ariel Sharon and 1,000 soldiers, acting as bodyguards, to the Al Aqsa Mosque at Temple-Mount. The arrival of Ariel Sharon, the opposition leader of the Likud Party in Israel, was approved by Barak (Issac, J.). This event compounded with Palestinian frustration from the failures of multiple agreements and accords led to the Second Intifada.   

The first days of the Intifada were characterized by large nonviolent demonstrations. In response, the demonstrators were met with force from Israeli authorities (Allen). This force included rubber-coated bullets and live ammunition (Allen). This developed into military incursions involving helicopters and tanks in densely populated Palestinian areas. It is estimated that Israeli soldiers fired around 1.3 million rounds of ammunition during this time, which was revealed by the then director of Israeli military intelligence, Amos Malka. The Israelis' quick and violent response to the Palestinian uprising showed that they were not interested in a quick end to the conflict but rather wished to “drag the Palestinians into military confrontation,” as was determined by Abu Yusuf. “The Palestinians, and to some degree the Israelis, became the casualties of a process that promised peace and security but produced insecurity and division” is the reality of the conflict when persistent occupation led to radicalization in both societies (Bishara, M. (2007). Moreover, it is speculated that Israel was using the Intifada as a distraction from further settlement into Palestinian territory. During the first three years of the Intifada, there was constant disruption and uncertainty. Checkpoints and roadblocks appeared or moved without notice, as well as gates and separation barriers appeared and were moved at any point without notice.  

It is therefore evident that the efforts of foreign powers in peacekeeping and mediating the conflict between Palestine and Israel failed. The Oslo II Accords resulted in a hegemonic peace that privileges Israelis and discriminates against Palestinians. This outcome is the result of foreign intervention, as the United States became the main mediator in 1994, ultimately creating a bigger barrier between Palestine and Israel. The role of the United States in peace talks is crucial, as it is important to understand that they are allied with Israel. Therefore, these negotiations were as mentioned in the piece, asymmetric. This is due to Israel acknowledging that the United States would back their every move. In the Oslo Negotiations, Palestine had barely any representation, and no superpower in their corner. Further, with the second intifada erupting after the forceful arrival of the Israeli military into Palestinian territory had manifested a reaction from the Palestinian people. Although the effort of intervention in order to achieve peace as the goal, the powers intervening such as the United States, hold great political power in the International Arena. This gives extra power to the Israelis knowing that they have a powerful nation on their side.  

Their aggression, illegal settlement, and violence against innocent people have affected the lives of generations of Palestinians since 1917 and further since 1948, after the creation of the state of Israel. It continues to affect millions of Palestinian lives today with the ongoing genocide. Based on the cases presented in this piece, it is vital to understand that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not start on October 7th. The attacks on October 7th occurred within a historical context of continuous restraints, aggression of the state and settlers, as well as the continuous apartheid Palestinians are subject to from the Israelis. There is a lack of foreign intervention in order to achieve peace and stop the genocide in Palestine now. This leads to speculation that there was never a plan to reach everlasting peace by the institutions that dictate policy. Therefore, it is up to the people to continue advocating for a free Palestine and an end to the genocide now. 

Works Cited

Allen, L. (2008). GETTING BY THE OCCUPATION: How Violence Became Normal during the Second Palestinian Intifada. Cultural Anthropology, 23(3), 453–487. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2008.00015.x 

Baumgarten, H., Martin Beck, & Suleiman Rabadi. (2004). The myth of Camp David or the distortion of the Palestinian narrative (By Birzeit University & Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; L. Wick & D. Nakhala, Eds.). https://fada.birzeit.edu/bitstream/20.500.11889/4654/1/The%20Myth%20of%20Camp%20David%20Or%20The%20Distortion%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20Narrative.pdf 

Bishara, M. (2007, November 5). The Undeclared Palestinian Civil War. Le Monde Diplomatique. https://mondediplo.com/2007/11/05palestine 

Hassan, S. (2011). Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine. Social Scientist, Vol. 39(No. 7/8), 65–72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289422 

Issac, J. (n.d.). 40 years of Israeli occupation. https://www.arij.org/atlas40/intro.html 

Justus R. Weiner, The Hebron Protocol. The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of the End of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 373, 416 (1997) https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1664&context=ilj 

Milestones in the history of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian. (n.d.). https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo 

Shlaim, Avi,. « The Oslo Accord » . Institute For Palestine Studies, www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/39986.